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Abstract 
This paper examines the presence of political cycles in Portuguese governments’ 
expenditures. The empirical analysis is done using monthly data for the main categories of 
government expenditures. The results indicate that Portuguese governments act 
opportunistically regarding the budget surplus and that they also favour capital instead of 
current spending near elections. Furthermore, right-wing governments tend to be more 
prone to expenditures’ reduction and deficits after the elections. A disaggregated analysis 
for the main components of government expenditures corroborates the previous findings 
and shows other relevant patterns of political manipulations. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the presence of political budget cycles in the Portuguese 
fiscal policy. Policy makers in democracies have clear incentives to use economic policies 
to their own advantage. Therefore, the influence of electoral concerns and government 
ideology on short-term economic performance has been an important topic in Public 
Choice. Empirics has consistently shown evidence of periodical shifts in economic 
aggregates associated with political motives, although mixed results are found regarding 
the partisan or opportunistic nature of these cycles. This article focuses on the particular 
case of government spending and budget, and on the individual case of Portugal. This type 
of investigation in a European Union country has an intriguing feature. We know that the 
Stability and Growth Pact constrains UE members’ fiscal policy, however not much else 
really remains to maneuver before elections and, in reality, some studies have found 
evidence that, although constrained, fiscal policy exhibits political motives. However, 
Portuguese reality is under-researched especially at the national level and constitutes an 
excellent testing ground to examine Brender and Drazen’s (2005) claim that political 
budget cycles are a phenomena of new democracies. Furthermore, in recent years we 
have witnessed a renewed interest on the understanding of fiscal policy determinants and 
outcomes, more so in the case of a country like Portugal that since the turn of the decade 
is experiencing budgetary control difficulties. 
We use an extensive dataset to explore different levels and different aggregates 
related to fiscal policy. We make use of monthly data for the budget surplus, for current 
and capital expenditures and for their main components. The use of monthly data is an 
important advantage when it comes to accurately control electoral effects. Also, the 
disaggregation of total expenditures allows us to check the existence of a competence 
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signaling process similar to the one described by Rogoff (1990). In particular, going deeper 
in the composition of government expenditures for ten main areas of government 
spending allows us to explore different dimensions of the political budget cycle. 
The results provided by this study are quite interesting. They show an 
opportunistic behaviour by the Portuguese governments in what concerns to aggregated 
expenditures and the government budget surplus. They also show that right-wing 
governments are more concerned in reducing expenditures and the government deficit 
after the elections than left-wing ones. There is also evidence of strategic manipulation of 
the composition of expenditures, as more is spent in election years on capital 
expenditures, probably on items that are highly visible to electorate. This later conclusion 
is supported by the more disaggregated analysis that follows, and other relevant patterns 
of political manipulations are also found in the component based empirical results.  
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and the econometric model to be used in the 
empirical analysis. The empirical results are presented and discussed in section 4 and 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Review of the literature 
The seminal work of Downs (1957) emphasizes the idea that economic strategies 
are not politically harmless nor political choices are free of economic concerns. To better 
understand this relationship numerous scholars have tried to comprehend how the 
ideological preferences of governments, the electoral agenda, and the competition 
between parties affect macroeconomic variables. Two main theories emerge from the 
literature: the political business cycle approach (Nordhaus, 1975) and the partisan theory 
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(Hibbs, 1977). The first assumes that politicians have no policy preferences, so they act 
"opportunistically" selecting the policies that maximize their electoral support. They 
create unusual favorable economic conditions before an election and - in order to correct 
this artificial unbalance – contractionary measures are implemented immediately after the 
elections. Alternatively, the partisan theory does not view politicians as homogenous, 
arguing that different parties have different policy objectives, behaving, when in office, in 
a partisan manner.1 Specifically, left-wing parties are relatively more concerned with 
unemployment (growth) than with inflation, whereas right-wing parties are especially 
worried with inflation control. 
In the 1980's and 1990´s rational versions of both theories emerged, exploring the 
assumption that voters form expectations rationally. In a context where competence and 
asymmetric information are the key elements, both rational partisan models (Alesina, 
1987; Alesina and Sachs, 1988) and rational opportunistic models (Rogoff and Sibert, 
1988; Rogoff, 1990) resulted in the reduction of policymaker's ability to induce political 
cycles. 
Empirical studies suggest that favorable economic conditions benefit governments 
(Hibbs, 2006). Partisan behavior seems to be more frequent in developed countries 
(Alesina and Roubini, 1992; Alesina et al., 1997), while opportunistic behavior appears to 
gather more support in developing countries (see, for instance, Brender and Drazen, 
2009;Vergne, 2009; and Shi and Svensson, 2006). 
Along with the other main economic aggregates, governments’ fiscal policy has 
also been studied to see if it is governed by political as much as economic considerations. 
The extension of the traditional approaches to fiscal policy is straightforward: boosts in 
                                                 
1The partisan model generates policy effects after elections, while the opportunist model generates policy 
effects before elections. 
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expenditures and/or revenue reductions prior to elections should signal opportunistic 
behavior, while in the partisan perspective left-wing governments are more prone to 
budget deficits than their counterparts. The actual modeling of political budgetary cycles 
came with Rogoff and Sibert’s (1988) work that presented a model of adverse selection 
underlining competence and asymmetric information. A further refinement made by 
Rogoff (1990) highlighted the need to search budgetary cycles inside the broad 
aggregates, especially in the composition of government spending. The model considers 
that the most efficient way for governments to signal competence is to divert spending 
from capital spending to current spending thus favoring transfers and more visible 
programs. The idea is to increase those expenditures that send the strongest signals, 
consequently trading those that generate benefits over time for those that are noticeable 
immediately. 
Several studies, both at national and multi-national level, have provided evidence 
of the relationship between elections and fiscal policy manipulations. Shi and Svensson 
(2002a, b; 2006), using multi-country data, consistently capture political budget cycles and 
show that the effect is significantly stronger in less developed countries. In their latter 
article they find that, on average, fiscal deficits increases by 22% in election years. For a 
set of developed countries, Persson and Tabellini (2003) find a political revenue cycle, but 
no trace of political cycle in expenditures, budget or transfers. Focusing on EU countries 
Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) do not find a fiscal electoral cycle, Mink and de Haan (2006) 
report a budget deficit increase in electoral years and a significant but small partisan 
effect on fiscal aggregates, while Efthyvoulou (2012) concludes that governments across 
the EU tend to generate budgetary opportunistic cycles and that these are much larger in 
the Eurozone countries. Highlighting institutional features, Persson and Tabellini (2002) 
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show that the form of government (presidential or parliamentary) and the electoral rules 
(proportional or majoritarian) affect the configuration of budget cycles. 
Other studies explore the expenditure components. Alesina (1988), for example, 
reports a small electoral cycle in transfers in the United States. For Canada, the results 
found by Blais and Nadeau (1992) suggest a short pre-electoral cycle observable on road 
expenditures and social services, while Potrafke (2010), focusing on direct transfer 
payments, finds that incumbents increase the growth of public health expenditures in 
election years. For Portugal there is some relevant research done but restricted to the 
local governments’ political budget cycle. For example, Veiga and Veiga (2007a) report an 
increase in local governments’ total expenditures before elections and a change in their 
composition that favors items immediately visible to the electorate, namely investment 
expenditures on overpasses, streets and complementary works, and on rural roads.2 One 
of the main objectives of the present article is to check if this behavior of local authorities 
is also present at the national level of Portuguese governance. 
 
3. Data and econometric model 
The dataset used in this analysis to explore the presence of opportunism and 
partisan effects in the composition of Portuguese government expenditures comprises of 
monthly data for the ratio of current and capital government expenditures to the 
government total expenditures (CurrExpd and CapExpd),3 government budget surplus 
                                                 
2Also at local level, Veiga and Pinho (2007) analyze the political determinants related to the allocation of 
intergovernmental grants and Veiga and Veiga (2007b) find that there is an electoral payoff to opportunistic 
investment expenditures. 
3
 Note that total government expenditures is equal to current plus capital government expenditures, 
therefore, CapExpd=1-CurrExpd. The ratios are used in the empirical analysis because, contrary to their 
levels, they are stationary (see stationarity tests in Table A.4 in Annex). 
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(GovBS) and unemployment rate (UR) over the period 1991:1 to 2013:6, collected from 
the Bank of Portugal. 
In order to go deeper in the investigation of potential politically driven changes in 
the composition of Portuguese government expenditures, we also consider in this analysis 
seven of its components for the same time period. Following the economic classification 
these expenditures are: Personnel, Goods and Services, Interest, Subsidies, Current 
Transfers, Capital Goods and Capital Transfers (see Table A.2 in Annex for more details). 
Each component is then divided by the total expenditures – similarly to capital 
expenditures – and then estimated separately as a time series. 
Most studies use annual or quarterly data, however the use of monthly data not 
only increases the number of available observations but also has the important advantage 
of allowing a more accurate control of electoral timings. Following Alesina et al. (1997), 
some political variables were added to this dataset to control for opportunistic and 
partisan effects at the two different dimensions/disaggregated levels considered in this 
study: variables that take value 1 in the previous # months to the elections, including the 
month of the elections(PreElect#); variables that take value 1 in the # months after the 
elections (PostElect#); a variable that takes value 1 when right-wing governments are in 
office and -1 in case of a left-wing government (TPart); variables that takes the value 1 in 
the # months after a right-wing party has taken office and -1 in the # months in case of a 
left-wing party (RPart#); and some variables equal to previous (RPart#) but that only 
include those cases in which an election changes the ideology of the government from the 
left to right or from right to left (CRPart#). All Portuguese governments have been led by 
the Social Democratic Party (PSD) or by the Socialist Party (PS), the first being on the right 
side of the political spectrum and the second on the left. A complete description of the 
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variables is presented in Table A.1 of the Annex. Descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in this study are reported in Table A.3 of the Annex. 
We employ a dynamic time-series analysis where the dependent variables 
(CapExpd, GovBS, or each of the expenditures components) will depend upon some of 
their lags, the change in unemployment rate,4 and a set of political variables: 
t
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 (1) 
where t=1991:1,…,2013:6 and Mi represent monthly dummy variables that are included in 
the model to control for seasonality. In a second set of regressions CapExpd is replaced by 
GovBS. Additionally in the expenditure component analyses, we replace CapExpd by each 
of the seven types of expenditures – one at a time. In both of these experiments, the set 
of regressors in the right side of the equation remains unchanged. The empirical results 
from all these experiments are presented and analysed in the next section. 
 
4. Empirical results 
In this section, we provide a set of empirical results on the presence of 
opportunistic and partisan effects in government expenditures and budget. We start by 
analysing the effects at the lowest degree of disaggregation, comparing effects related to 
capital and current expenditures. We then look for evidence of opportunistic and/or 
partisan behaviour regarding the government budget surplus. Finally, we go deeper inside 
expenditures and explore the presence of political effects at a more disaggregated level, 
considering seven components of current and capital expenditures, as given by the 
economic classification. 
                                                 
4
 ADF and PP unit root tests reported in Table A.4 in Annex indicate that it is the first difference in the 
unemployment rate that is stationary. The other variables are not following a unit root process. 
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4.1 Results for capital expenditures and government budget surplus 
We start by considering as dependent variable the ratio of government capital 
expenditures to the total expenditures (CapExpd). Four lags of this variable are needed to 
control for the autocorrelation in the error term. Lag two of the change in the 
unemployment rate was also considered given that it provided the highest level of 
significance for its estimated coefficient. As expected, when the unemployment rate rises, 
the ratio of capital expenditures decreases, a fact that can be justified by the consequent 
increase in the current expenditures to pay those additional unemployment subsidies. In 
the estimations explaining the governments’ capital expenditures percentages reported in 
Table 1, a set of political variables is introduced. The first two regressions try to analyze 
the government’s opportunism regarding the timing of the elections. The first tries to 
capture the ex-ante effect and the second the ex-post effect that are predicted by the 
theory. Several periods were considered before and after the elections but the ones 
reported in the tables were those that produced the highest significant coefficients. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
On the one hand, we observe that before elections – in particular, half a year 
before elections – the ratio of government capital expenditures to the total expenditures 
tends to increase, a result in line with those found by Veiga and Veiga (2007a) for 
Portuguese local governments. This effect is compensated by a decreased in the ratio of 
current expenditures to the total.5 On the other hand, during a period of six months after 
                                                 
5As mentioned above, CapExpd=1-CurrExpd by definition. This means that there is symmetry in the effects 
when the variable CurrExpd replaces CapExpd in the regressions. Hence, there is no need to replicate those 
results here, since the respective coefficients will be the same (as well as the respective standard errors) but 
with symmetric signs. 
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the elections, the ratio of government capital expenditures to the total decreases 
significantly.6 These results point to a complete opportunistic cycle that favours capital 
expenditures before elections and current expenditures after. Probably the preference for 
capital expenditures before elections is related to competence signalling. Increased 
spending onshort term interventions in order to improve highly visible infrastructures like, 
for instance, roads, schools and hospitals; increased spending to speed up the conclusion 
of infrastructures being constructed to coincide with election dates, and other potential 
“ribbon cutting” capital expenditures may explain the pre electoral cycle found. In a sense, 
our results contradict Rogoff’s (1990) model that posits an increase in current 
expenditures rather than in capital expenditures near elections. However, the key note 
here is that governments’ should focus on visible expenditures as they send strong 
competence signals. So capital versus current spending in Rogoff’s model seems to be a 
bit different than the two typical types of expenditures found in accounting. As such, the 
conclusion drawn from our results is that probably the Portuguese governments give 
preference to visible capital expenditures rather than visible current expenditures when 
elections are approaching and the contraction that follows the elections corrects the 
unbalance by favouring current expenditures. 
Next, we test for the presence of partisan effects. We start by testing the 
traditional partisan theory using a dummy that takes value 1 for right-wing governments 
and -1 for left-wing ones. No significant effects are found in this case. The same result is 
observed when we test for the rational partisan theory using the variable RPart#. Several 
                                                 
6
More specifically, half a year before elections this ratio increases by about 1.9 percentage points, while 
during the six month period after the elections it decreases by about 2.3 percentage points. For longer 
periods before the elections, no significant coefficients were found; after the elections, we were able to find 
some significant effects (but only marginally) until nine months after the elections have occurred. 
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periods after the elections were considered, but none has produced significant 
coefficients. Hence, we report the results for the one that produced the lowest p-value 
(RPart6). However the degree of electoral surprise may be greater when the party elected 
represents an ideological shift in power. Alesina et. al. (1997) argue that the electoral 
outcome of re-election can be less surprising than an actual ideological change in 
government. Therefore, as a refinement of the Rpart# variable, we employ CRPart#that 
takes the value 1 (-1) in the # months starting with a change to a right-wing (left-wing) 
government. Results in regression 6 provide an interesting result: right-wing governments 
seem to be more prone to cut on capital expenditures after elections than left-wing 
parties. More specifically, while both types of governments tend to restrict capital 
expenditures until about six months after the elections as part of the opportunistic 
behaviour, right-wing governments tend to promote deeper and longer cuts in time; they 
are disposed to keep those cuts until about two years after the elections, exhibiting a 
partisan preference in accordance with theoretical expectations. This conclusion is also 
corroborated when all political variables are included in the model (regression 7) and even 
when the growth rate of government capital expenditures (homologous variation) is used 
instead of its ratio to the government total expenditures (see column 8). This last 
estimation shows that the results found using the ratio of capital expenditures to total 
expenditures still hold in the more traditional growth rate approach. 
Additionally, we also test for the presence of opportunism and ideological effects 
concerning the government budget surplus (GovBS). The respective results are shown in 
Table 2. Only lag 12 of the dependent variable is needed to control for the autocorrelation 
in the error term. Regarding the unemployment rate, its fifth lag is the one that provides 
the highest level of significance for its estimated coefficient. The results show that when 
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the unemployment rate rises, the government surplus decreases. This can be due to the 
consequent increase in the current expenditures with unemployment subsidies and, at the 
same time, this may indicate a slowdown in the economic activity, and a consequent 
decrease in tax revenues. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
In the following analysis, we pursue a similar pattern to the one considered in 
Table 1. We start by controlling for the presence of political opportunism before elections 
considering the partisan effects. In columns 1 and 2, we observe that before elections – in 
particular, a quarter before elections – the government budget surplus decreases (or the 
deficit increases) on average by about 300 millions of euros; however, after the elections 
no significant effects are found even though the coefficient on PostElect12 is positive.7 
This means that, in this case, the political opportunism is only significantly felt before the 
elections and that probably has its origin in the expenditures’ pre-electoral boost reported 
in Table 1. After elections the receipts might be counterbalancing the contraction of 
expenditures reported previously. 
Regarding the partisan or ideological effects, we find evidence of both traditional 
and rational partisan effects. However, the rational partisan effects have proved to be 
more relevant than the traditional ones (see regression 6). The change in government 
ideology with the elections is also important. Regression 5 shows that a new right-wing 
government will contribute to an increase of around 200 million euros in the government 
budget surplus until about two years after the elections. Nevertheless, this effect remains 
valid during the first year after the elections and even if no ideological change is verified 
(see regressions 4 and 6). 
                                                 
7A period of 12 months after the election is chosen because it is the one that presents the lowest p-value for 
the respective estimated coefficient. 
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When both the opportunistic and partisan effects are controlled for at the same 
time in the same regression (columns 7 and 8), we confirm the importance of both effects 
simultaneously and can conclude that Portuguese governments tend to act 
opportunistically before the elections, with right-wing governments being more 
concerned with budget control than the left-wing ones, especially after the elections. This 
result combines features of both partisan and opportunistic theory and it is in line with 
Frey and Schneider’s (1978) argument that before elections governments’ tend to act 
opportunistically to gather public support and afterwards follow ideological preferences. 
In sum, this analysis shows that Portuguese governments act opportunistically 
regarding expenditures and the respective budget surplus. Moreover, our results also 
show that right-wing governments tend to be more concerned in reducing expenditures 
and the government deficit after the elections. However, two important questions remain 
to be answered: Which components of the expenditures play the main role in that 
opportunistic behaviour? Furthermore, do right or left-wing governments have a similar 
behaviour regarding the composition of those expenditures? These are two important 
issues that we try to answer in the next step of this study. 
 
4.2 Results for the composition of government expenditures 
A similar analysis is now provided for each of the seven components of 
government expenditures as defined by the economic classification: Personnel, Goods and 
Services (CurrGoods), Interest, Subsidies, Current Transfers (CurrTransf), Capital Goods 
(CapGoods) and Capital Transfers (CapTransf). Each of these dependent variables is also 
used in the empirical estimations as its ratio to the total expenditures. A summary of the 
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results is presented in Table 3. In the Annex the detailed results for each component are 
reported (Tables A.5 to A.11). 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
In Table 3, only the results for the coefficients on the political variables are 
reported, meaning that each coefficient relates to a single regression that was estimated 
including the necessary lags of the dependent variable to eliminate any error 
autocorrelation, the required (lagged) change in the unemployment rate, and monthly 
dummies to control for seasonality. At the bottom of the table the number of months 
used for each political variable are also reported (for further details, see Tables A.5 to A.11 
in Annex). Several periods were considered before and after the elections but the ones 
reported in the tables were those that produced the lowest p-values for the respective 
estimated coefficient. 
It seems that there is no political tempering with public wages and current 
transfers that include assistance to the unemployed, fire fighters and other non-
reimbursable monetary flows that help institutions face their current expenditures. At 
some degree these are unexpected results as a common sense approach would find their 
tempering plausible and electorally effective. 
As expected, the results at this more disaggregated level of public expenditures 
also show evidence of opportunistic and partisan behaviour. Regarding the first group of 
effects, we observe that the ratio of expenditures on capital goods to total expenditures 
increases before elections. This is in line with our findings at a more aggregated level and 
reinforces Rogoff ‘s(1990) argument that public spending should be diverted to items 
more visible to voters before elections. We also found evidence of a post electoral cycle 
related to capital transfers as these expenditures tend to decrease after the elections. 
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These results help clarify the capital components in which political cycles play a major 
role. 
When we take a closer look to the disaggregated governments’ current 
expenditures traditional partisan effects clearly dominate. The ratios of current goods and 
services, subsidies, and interests all seem to be higher when right-wing parties are in 
office as opposed to left ruling. We had no prior theoretical expectations regarding 
partisan effects on these particular components, however as it seems that right-wing 
parties favour them, probably the expenditures that are being increased in these 
components are those with the military, price grants and other expenditures theoretically 
more attached to the right. Regarding the interest component, in general governments 
pay current interests from loans negotiated in the past. As we find evidence that this 
partisan effect appears to be stronger in the first half of the term it seems that right-wing 
governments could be paying, at least in part, the above average indebtment of previous 
governments, in particular left-wing ones. In this sense our results are in accordance with 
theoretical expectations that left-wing parties are more prone to deficits than their 
counterparts. 
When looking at capital transfers both opportunistic and partisan effects seem to 
be at play, revealing some puzzling results. The effects found seem to indicate a post 
electoral reduction on this component in the six months following an election, and that 
this reduction is reinforced and holds for the first half of a term when a change in the 
political orientation of the government occurs with the election of a “new” right-wing 
government. This “new” right-wing government (PSD) tends to be more concerned in 
reducing capital transfers until two years after the elections than a “new” left-wing 
 16 
government (PS). So, the post electoral reductions in capital expenditures observed in 
table 1 (see column 6), are essentially due to movements in capital transfers. 
To make a robustness check to the overall results found in table 3 we estimated 
each expenditure component considering the simultaneous inclusion of all political 
variables and, in addition, regressed each component with only those political variables 
that proved to be statistically significant in the “all in” regressions. Results are available in 
Table A.12 in Annex and, in general, corroborate the opportunistic and partisan effects 
found above.8 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyse whether public expenditures in Portugal are politically 
driven near elections and whether right-wing governments tend to be more constrained 
when it comes to spending than left-wing governments. 
The empirical analyses employed in this paper to examine these questions 
revealed the existence of both opportunistic and partisan effects, although electoral ones 
were found to be relatively more significant and robust. In general, the way Portuguese 
governments are found to “play” with aggregated expenditures and the respective 
components is consistent with previous studies and theoretical expectations. Results point 
out to the presence of a full opportunist cycle in capital expenditures as described by 
Nordhaus (1975). Both pre-electoral expansions and post-electoral contractions are found, 
however this last effect disappears when we examine the budget deficit. Furthermore, 
                                                 
8
 In those regressions in which Rpart# and CRPart# were found to be jointly significant (Personnel and 
Current Transfers), we tested the null that the sum of their coefficients was zero. Test results did not 
rejected the null, so we conclude that there are no rational partisan effects found in the referred 
components. 
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right-wing governments tend to be more concerned in reducing expenditures and the 
government deficit after the elections than left-wing ones. It seems that Portuguese 
governments act opportunistically when they really need to and behave in a partisan 
manner when they can. 
When taking a closer look at expenditures, detailing and analysing their 
components, we found that the contraction of capital expenditures after elections is due 
to a reduction in the capital transfers and not related to variations on the Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation. Furthermore, we observe that the ratio of expenditures on capital 
goods to total expenditures increases before elections, confirming the already found 
opportunistic behaviour on aggregate capital expenditures, and reinforcing the idea that 
public spending is systematically being diverted to items more visible to voters before 
elections. 
Finally, the results indicate the presence of partisan effects in some current 
expenditures components. For instance, right-wing governments appear to pay more 
interests on debt than left-wing ones. Hence, our results seem to suggest that right-wing 
governments could be paying, at least in part, the above average indebtment of left-wing 
governments. 
 18 
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Empirical results for the government capital expenditures 
 Opportunism Partisan All Growth 
  Traditional Rational   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
CapExpd(-1) 0.153** 0.151** 0.161*** 0.157** 0.149** 0.139** 0.116* -0.146** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) 
CapExpd(-2) 0.074 0.072 0.081 0.080 0.073 0.064 0.051 -0.076 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.060) 
CapExpd(-3) 0.109* 0.106* 0.106* 0.105* 0.102 0.101 0.093 0.094 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.62) (0.062) (0.060) 
CapExpd(-4) 0.194*** 0.198*** 0.189*** 0.191*** 0.181*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.229*** 
 (0.61) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) 
UR(-2) -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.095*** -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.091*** -1.309** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.509) 
PreElect7 0.019*      0.016  
 (0.011)      (0.011)  
PostElect6  -0.023**    -0.023** -0.020* -0.432** 
  (0.011)    (0.011) (0.011) (0.202) 
TPart   0.001    0.007  
   (0.004)    (0.005)  
RPart6    0.009   0.014  
    (0.010)   (0.011)  
CRPart24     -0.012* -0.012* -0.023** -0.239** 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.121) 
         
         
No. Obs. 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 255 
R
2
 0.392 0.394 0.384 0.386 0.391 0.401 0.415 0.163 
B-G test 0.941 0.853 0.923 0.882 0.907 0.695 0.776 0.497 
SBIC -616.0 -617.0 -612.8 -613.5 -615.6 -614.6 -604.6 861.2 
Notes: Standard-errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%.  is the first difference operator. All regressions include monthly dummies to 
control for seasonality. Four lags of the dependent variable are needed to control for autocorrelation; the p-
value for the Breusch-Godfrey test to autocorrelation of order 1 is reported in the bottom of the table, as 
well as the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). The last column presents results for the growth 
rate of capital expenditures. 
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Table 2. Empirical results for the government budget surplus 
 Opportunism Partisan Both 
  Traditional Rational  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
GovBS(-12) 0.310*** 0.309*** 0.290*** 0.303*** 0.314*** 0.295*** 0.303*** 0.307*** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) 
UR(-5) -0.838*** -0.891*** -1.077*** -0.981*** -1.007*** -1.062*** -1.026*** -0.948*** 
 (0.267) (0.269) (0.278) (0.267) (0.273) (0.277) (0.283) (0.266) 
PreElect3 -0.297*      -0.269* -0.303** 
 (0.157)      (0.159) (0.155) 
PostElect12  0.064     0.056  
  (0.086)     (0.086)  
TPart   0.102**   0.054 0.049  
   (0.042)   (0.050) (0.055)  
RPart12    0.192***  0.141* 0.163* 0.193*** 
    (0.069)  (0.083) (0.088) (0.069) 
CRPart24     0.204**  0.019  
     (0.094)  (0.086)  
         
         
No. Obs. 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 
R
2
 0.462 0.455 0.467 0.471 0.465 0.473 0.482 0.479 
B-G test 0.586 0.716 0.448 0.344 0.487 0.316 0.231 0.254 
SBIC 564.8 568.0 562.4 560.7 563.6 565.0 577.4 562.2 
Notes: Standard-errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%.  is the first difference operator. All regressions include monthly dummies do 
control for seasonality. Only the lag 12 of the dependent variable is needed to control for autocorrelation; 
the p-value for the Breusch-Godfrey test to autocorrelation of order 1 is reported in the bottom of the table, 
as well as the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). 
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Table 3. Results by component of government expenditures – one variable at a time 
 Personnel CurrGoods Interest Subsidies CurrTransf CapGoods CapTransf 
        
PreElect# 0.010 -0.001 -0.013 -0.003 -0.004 0.004* 0.018 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.012) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.011) 
PostElect# 0.010 0.041** 0.021 0.001 -0.011 -0.002 -0.020* 
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.015) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.011) 
TPart 0.001 0.002** 0.163*** 0.002** -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
RPart# -0.012 0.001 0.012* 0.003 -0.008 0.001 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.015) 
CRPart# 0.007 (0.002) -0.023 0.003 0.027 -0.0016 -0.013* 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.024) 0.003 (0.017) (0.0013) (0.007) 
        
        
No. Obs. 265 265 267 265 265 265 267 
Months PreElect9 PreElect12 PreElect8 PreElect6 PreElect11 PreElect8 PreElect6 
 PosElect3 PosElect3 PosElect5 PosElect12 PosElect3 PosElect11 PosElect6 
 RPart3 RPart9 RPart24 RPart6 RPart6 RPart12 RPart3 
 CRPart9 CRPart9 CRPart3 CRPart6 CRPart3 CRPart24 CRPart24 
Notes: Only the results for the political variables are reported here, but the estimated specification also includes the 
necessary lags of the dependent variable, to eliminate any error autocorrelation, the (lagged) change in the 
unemployment rate, which has almost always a significant coefficient, and monthly dummies to control for 
seasonality. Each variable was included at a time in the estimated specification. See Tables A.5 to A.11 in Annex for 
complete results. Standard-errors are reported in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis 
is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The number of months used for each political variable is reported at 
the bottom of the table. Those are the ones that presented the lowest p-value for the respective estimated 
coefficients. 
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Annex 
 
 
Table A.1 – Definition of the variables 
Time series  
CapExpd Ratio of the government capital expenditures to the government total expenditures. 
GovBS Government budget surplus (in billions of Euros). 
UR Unemployment rate. 
PreElect# Variable that takes the value of 1 in the month of the elections and in the previous # months to the 
elections; election dates: 10/1991; 10/1995; 10/1999; 03/2002; 02/2005; 09/2009; 06/2011. 
PostElect# Variable that takes value 1 in the # months after the elections. 
TPart Traditional partisan variable that takes the value of 1 when a right-wing government is in office and -1 in 
case of a left-wing government. 
RPart# Rational partisan variable that takes the value of 1 in the # months after a right-wing party has taken 
office and -1 in the # months in case of a left-wing party. 
CRPart# Variable equal to RPart# but that only includes those cases in which an election changes the ideology of 
the government (left to right or right to left). 
Sources: Online Statistics, Bank of Portugal (BPstat). 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2 – The components of the government total expenditures (Economic classification) 
GOVERNMENT CURRENT EXPENDITURES  
Personnel(Personnel) 
Wages and other gratifications to public servants and to individuals that are hired by the state 
Goods and Services (CurrGoods) 
Other current expenditures non related to wages like, for instance: constructions and military works that 
are not in nature capital expenditures; spending’s with military material, desk material, food, uniforms; 
conservation, communications, transportation. 
Interest and other charges (Interest) 
Expenditures related to current public debt charges. 
Subsidies (Subsidies) 
Financial flows without reimbursement from the state to public companies. It includes also expenditures 
with price grants and subsidies to the production of goods considered essential. 
Current Transfers (CurrTransf) 
Non reimbursable monetary flows that have the objective of helping institutions or entities face their 
current expenditures. Examples: Assistance to the unemployed, fire fighters, and community based 
institutions like sporting clubs and non-profitable organizations. 
GOVERNMENT CAPITAL EXPENDITURES 
Capital Goods (CapGoods) 
Gross fixed capital formation. 
Capital Transfers (CapTransf) 
Non reimbursable Public Spendings to fund capital expenditures of another entity. Examples: 
compensations for damages in buildings or crops; amortization of loans. 
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Table A.3 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Time Series      
CapExpd 271 0.111 0.081 0.014 0.482 
GovBS 271 -0.560 0.823 -4.034 2.721 
UR 271 7.840 3.313 3.900 17.80 
Elect 272 0.026 0.159 0.000 1.000 
TPart 272 -0.118 0.995 -1.000 1.000 
      
Expenditures Components      
Personnel 271 0.285 0.074 0.013 0.531 
CurrGoods 271 0.033 0.018 0.007 0.131 
Interest 271 0.130 0.098 -0.049 0.471 
Subsidies 271 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.120 
CurrTransf 271 0.415 0.115 0.183 0.700 
CapGoods 271 0.018 0.021 0.000 0.214 
CapTransf 271 0.093 0.073 0.012 0.467 
      
Sources: See Tables A.1 and A.2. The components of public expenditures are all in the ratio to total 
expenditures. 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4 – Unit root tests 
 Time Series    
 CapExpd GovBS UR UR    
ADF -8.845 -13.13 1.306 -7.009    
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.997] [0.000]    
PP -13.63 -18.84 3.702 -7.744    
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.999] [0.000]    
        
 Expenditures components    
 Personnel CurrGoods Interest Subsidies CurrTransf CapGoods CapTransf 
ADF -8.176 -12.84 -9.465 -11.66 -4.563 -12.54 -8.846 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
PP -15.33 -18.57 -11.74 -17.03 -6.351 -17.24 -13.29 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
        
Notes: For sources, see Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3.  is the first difference operator. For each test, we report 
the respective statistic and p-value (in square brackets). The ADF and PP tests are, respectively, the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test that a variable follows a unit-root process, with 
constant and one lag of the difference of the respective variable. 
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Table A.5 – Empirical results for ratio of personnel to total government expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lag#1 0.0323 0.0373 0.0355 0.0355 0.0338 0.0291 0.0314 
 (0.0612) (0.0613) (0.0614) (0.0612) (0.0613) (0.0611) (0.0610) 
Lag#2 0.1161* 0.1200** 0.1204** 0.1192* 0.1200** 0.1108* 0.1162* 
 (0.0606) (0.0607) (0.0608) (0.0606) (0.0607) (0.0605) (0.0604) 
Lag#3 0.1411** 0.1427** 0.1388** 0.1391** 0.1400** 0.1485** 0.1428** 
 (0.0597) (0.0600) (0.0600) (0.0598) (0.0599) (0.0598) (0.0596) 
Lag#4 0.2052*** 0.2028*** 0.2004*** 0.1962*** 0.2049*** 0.2102*** 0.2034*** 
 (0.0599) (0.0601) (0.0601) (0.0600) (0.0602) (0.0601) (0.0599) 
Lag#5 0.2053*** 0.2015*** 0.2019*** 0.2011*** 0.2045*** 0.2107*** 0.2070*** 
 (0.0609) (0.0610) (0.0611) (0.0609) (0.0611) (0.0609) (0.0608) 
Lag#6 0.2200*** 0.2101*** 0.2155*** 0.2125*** 0.2198*** 0.2201*** 0.2196*** 
 (0.0626) (0.0630) (0.0629) (0.0627) (0.0629) (0.0630) (0.0626) 
ΔUR(-4) -0.0110 -0.0115 -0.0136 -0.0121 -0.0138 -0.0162 -0.0161 
 (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0203) (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0203) (0.0196) 
PreElect9 -0.0101     -0.0093  
 (0.0066)     (0.0067)  
PostElect3  0.0096    0.0069  
  (0.0103)    (0.0104)  
TPart   0.0010   0.0007  
   (0.0028)   (0.0031)  
RPart3    -0.0124  -0.0202* -0.0204* 
    (0.0098)  (0.0110) (0.0109) 
CRPart9     0.0070 0.0136 0.0140* 
     (0.0076) (0.0087) (0.0085) 
Constant -0.0670*** -0.0687*** -0.0662*** -0.0644*** -0.0695*** -0.0718*** -0.0696*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0248) 
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 
R-squared 0.6797 0.6778 0.6769 0.6788 0.6778 0.6860 0.6824 
B-Gtest 0.969 0.796 0.947 0.749 0.910 0.628 0.649 
SBIC -815.0 -813.5 -812.7 -814.3 -813.4 -798.0 -811.6 
 
 
Table A.6 – Empirical results for ratio of current goods and services to total government expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lag#6 0.2393*** 0.2334*** 0.2210*** 0.2404*** 0.2414*** 0.2150*** 0.2147*** 
 (0.0606) (0.0603) (0.0604) (0.0605) (0.0605) (0.0607) (0.0602) 
ΔUR(-4) -0.0075* -0.0075* -0.0104** -0.0081** -0.0083** -0.0104** -0.0103** 
 (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
PreElect12 -0.0011     -0.0004  
 (0.0013)     (0.0013)  
PostElect3  0.0041*    0.0038* 0.0040* 
  (0.0022)    (0.0022) (0.0021) 
TPart   0.0015**   0.0015** 0.0015** 
   (0.0006)   (0.0007) (0.0006) 
RPart9    0.0013  -0.0006  
    (0.0012)  (0.0019)  
CRPart9     0.0017 0.0009  
     (0.0016) (0.0024)  
Constant 0.0756*** 0.0747*** 0.0761*** 0.0753*** 0.0753*** 0.0756*** 0.0755*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 
R-squared 0.7561 0.7589 0.7614 0.7565 0.7565 0.7648 0.7646 
B-Gtest 0.158 0.263 0.242 0.153 0.149 0.381 0.384 
SBIC -1655.3 -1658.3 -1661.0 -1655.7 -1655.7 -1642.6 -1659.1 
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Table A.7 – Empirical results for ratio of interest to total government expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lag#1 0.3087*** 0.3042*** 0.2735*** 0.2968*** 0.3112*** 0.2509*** 0.2637*** 
 (0.0626) (0.0626) (0.0631) (0.0629) (0.0625) (0.0636) (0.0631) 
Lag#2 0.1511** 0.1485** 0.1304** 0.1434** 0.1461** 0.1191* 0.1204* 
 (0.0649) (0.0647) (0.0643) (0.0647) (0.0650) (0.0644) (0.0643) 
Lag#3 -0.1782*** -0.1765*** -0.2039*** -0.1888*** -0.1772*** -0.1995*** -0.2030*** 
 (0.0642) (0.0641) (0.0639) (0.0642) (0.0643) (0.0637) (0.0636) 
Lag#4 0.1795*** 0.1818*** 0.1431** 0.1677*** 0.1824*** 0.1367** 0.1390** 
 (0.0615) (0.0613) (0.0620) (0.0617) (0.0614) (0.0620) (0.0618) 
ΔUR(-2) 0.0186 0.0171 -0.0105 0.0026 0.0213 -0.0069 -0.0077 
 (0.0327) (0.0326) (0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0329) (0.0336) (0.0335) 
PreElect8 -0.0125     -0.0099  
 (0.0122)     (0.0124)  
PostElect5  0.0211    0.0195  
  (0.0147)    (0.0148)  
TPart   0.0163***   0.0201** 0.0185*** 
   (0.0056)   (0.0085) (0.0058) 
RPart24    0.0119*  -0.0025  
    (0.0067)  (0.0102)  
CRPart3     -0.0228 -0.0403* -0.0405* 
     (0.0236) (0.0241) (0.0238) 
Constant 0.0173 0.0119 0.0309 0.0220 0.0157 0.0313 0.0332 
 (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0205) (0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0207) (0.0205) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.3540 0.3566 0.3722 0.3594 0.3537 0.3868 0.3794 
B-Gtest 0.040 0.052 0.062 0.062 0.068 0.143 0.168 
SBIC -512.5 -513.6 -520.1 -514.7 -512.4 -504.0 -517.6 
 
 
 
Table A.8 – Empirical results for ratio of subsidies to total government expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ΔUR(-2) -0.0119** -0.0123** -0.0162*** -0.0122** -0.0124** -0.0159** -0.0160** 
 (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0063) (0.0062) 
PreElect6 -0.0028     -0.0025  
 (0.0025)     (0.0026)  
PostElect12  0.0009    0.0005  
  (0.0019)    (0.0020)  
TPart   0.0021**   0.0019* 0.0021** 
   (0.0009)   (0.0010) (0.0009) 
RPart6    0.0029  0.0008  
    (0.0022)  (0.0036)  
CRPart6     0.0033 0.0006  
     (0.0030) (0.0045)  
Constant 0.0473*** 0.0468*** 0.0475*** 0.0471*** 0.0470*** 0.0476*** 0.0478*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031) 
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 
R-squared 0.3388 0.3361 0.3489 0.3400 0.3387 0.3527 0.3519 
B-Gtest 0.372 0.339 0.536 0.384 0.384 0.579 0.576 
SBIC -1435.8 -1434.7 -1439.9 -1436.3 -1435.7 -1419.1 -1435.5 
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Table A.9 – Empirical results for ratio of current transfers to total government expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lag#1 0.1186** 0.1189** 0.1172* 0.1164* 0.1085* 0.0964 0.0954 
 (0.0599) (0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0602) (0.0599) 
Lag#2 0.0882 0.0901 0.0885 0.0879 0.0807 0.0720 0.0713 
 (0.0601) (0.0601) (0.0602) (0.0601) (0.0601) (0.0601) (0.0598) 
Lag#3 0.0245 0.0222 0.0218 0.0222 0.0267 0.0275 0.0272 
 (0.0581) (0.0580) (0.0582) (0.0580) (0.0578) (0.0578) (0.0574) 
Lag#4 0.2852*** 0.2823*** 0.2832*** 0.2847*** 0.2842*** 0.2856*** 0.2863*** 
 (0.0579) (0.0578) (0.0579) (0.0578) (0.0576) (0.0576) (0.0572) 
Lag#5 0.0861 0.0865 0.0867 0.0877 0.0959 0.1036* 0.1054* 
 (0.0600) (0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0600) (0.0597) 
Lag#6 0.3653*** 0.3677*** 0.3655*** 0.3659*** 0.3659*** 0.3661*** 0.3653*** 
 (0.0596) (0.0595) (0.0596) (0.0595) (0.0593) (0.0592) (0.0589) 
ΔUR(-2) 0.0312 0.0307 0.0343 0.0342 0.0280 0.0344 0.0340 
 (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0260) (0.0245) (0.0243) (0.0258) (0.0243) 
PreElect11 -0.0037     -0.0042  
 (0.0079)     (0.0080)  
PostElect3  -0.0111    -0.0127  
  (0.0131)    (0.0132)  
TPart   -0.0013   -0.0004  
   (0.0038)   (0.0041)  
RPart6    -0.0077  -0.0214* -0.0218** 
    (0.0089)  (0.0111) (0.0105) 
CRPart3     0.0269 0.0491** 0.0492** 
     (0.0168) (0.0200) (0.0199) 
Constant 0.0174 0.0189 0.0182 0.0176 0.0190 0.0263 0.0229 
 (0.0199) (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0204) (0.0198) 
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 
R-squared 0.7750 0.7755 0.7749 0.7755 0.7771 0.7820 0.7810 
B-Gtest 0.994 0.905 0.959 0.952 0.807 0.845 0.793 
SBIC -680.8 -681.3 -680.7 -681.4 -683.3 -666.8 -682.4 
 
 
Table A.10 – Empirical results for ratio of capital goods to total government expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lag#6 0.1682*** 0.1819*** 0.1794*** 0.1828*** 0.1704*** 0.1346** 0.1329** 
 (0.0615) (0.0613) (0.0613) (0.0615) (0.0620) (0.0624) (0.0622) 
ΔUR(-1) -0.0142*** -0.0129** -0.0155*** -0.0148*** -0.0123** -0.0142*** -0.0144*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0051) 
PreElect8 0.0035*     0.0034* 0.0039** 
 (0.0019)     (0.0020) (0.0019) 
PostElect11  -0.0021    -0.0011  
  (0.0017)    (0.0018)  
TPart   0.0009   0.0022** 0.0024** 
   (0.0008)   (0.0010) (0.0010) 
RPart12    0.0009  0.0011  
    (0.0014)  (0.0017)  
CRPart24     -0.0016 -0.0043*** -0.0040** 
     (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0016) 
Constant 0.0700*** 0.0709*** 0.0705*** 0.0703*** 0.0703*** 0.0710*** 0.0706*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 
R-squared 0.6834 0.6812 0.6809 0.6798 0.6811 0.6944 0.6933 
B-Gtest 0.148 0.129 0.125 0.094 0.122 0.298 0.322 
SBIC -1516.5 -1514.7 -1514.5 -1513.6 -1514.7 -1503.6 -1513.8 
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Table A.11 – Empirical results for ratio of capital transfers to total government expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lag#1 0.1352** 0.1350** 0.1436** 0.1439** 0.1302** 0.1079* 0.1209* 
 (0.0623) (0.0622) (0.0624) (0.0624) (0.0625) (0.0625) (0.0624) 
Lag#2 0.0602 0.0571 0.0657 0.0660 0.0571 0.0404 0.0479 
 (0.0622) (0.0622) (0.0624) (0.0623) (0.0622) (0.0620) (0.0621) 
Lag#3 0.1166* 0.1157* 0.1167* 0.1158* 0.1108* 0.1045* 0.1097* 
 (0.0623) (0.0622) (0.0626) (0.0625) (0.0623) (0.0619) (0.0620) 
Lag#4 0.1860*** 0.1850*** 0.1778*** 0.1775*** 0.1700*** 0.1794*** 0.1769*** 
 (0.0616) (0.0614) (0.0617) (0.0616) (0.0615) (0.0613) (0.0613) 
ΔUR(-2) -0.0781*** -0.0756*** -0.0759** -0.0780*** -0.0665** -0.0708** -0.0648** 
 (0.0286) (0.0285) (0.0297) (0.0287) (0.0291) (0.0293) (0.0290) 
PreElect6 0.0184     0.0161  
 (0.0113)     (0.0113)  
PostElect6  -0.0202*    -0.0176 -0.0208* 
  (0.0113)    (0.0114) (0.0112) 
TPart   -0.0006   0.0053  
   (0.0042)   (0.0052)  
RPart3    0.0122  0.0168  
    (0.0147)  (0.0153)  
CRPart24     -0.0130* -0.0210** -0.0134* 
     (0.0072) (0.0088) (0.0071) 
Constant 0.1105*** 0.1171*** 0.1115*** 0.1123*** 0.1142*** 0.1213*** 0.1200*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0168) (0.0168) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.2554 0.2569 0.2474 0.2495 0.2572 0.2809 0.2673 
B-Gtest 0.911 0.967 0.768 0.679 0.938 0.928 0.838 
SBIC -613.8 -614.3 -611.0 -611.7 -614.4 -600.8 -612.5 
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Table A.12 – Results by component of government expenditures – all political variables together 
 Personnel CurrGoods Interest Subsidies CurrTransf CapGoods CapTransf 
 All Main All Main All Main All Main All Main All Main All Main 
               
Lag#1 0.029 0.031   0.251*** 0.264***   0.096 0.095   0.108* 0.121* 
 (0.061) (0.061)   (0.064) (0.063)   (0.060) (0.060)   (0.063) (0.062) 
Lag#2 0.111* 0.116*   0.119* 0.120*   0.072 0.071   0.040 0.048 
 (0.061) (0.060)   (0.064) (0.064)   (0.060) (0.060)   (0.062) (0.062) 
Lag#3 0.149** 0.143**   -0.200*** -0.203***   0.028 0.027   0.105* 0.110* 
 (0.060) (0.060)   (0.064) (0.064)   (0.058) (0.057)   (0.062) (0.062) 
Lag#4 0.210*** 0.203***   0.137** 0.139**   0.286*** 0.286***   0.179*** 0.177*** 
 (0.060) (0.060)   (0.062) (0.062)   (0.058) (0.057)   (0.061) (0.061) 
Lag#5 0.211*** 0.207***       0.104* 0.105*     
 (0.061) (0.061)       (0.060) (0.060)     
Lag#6 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.215*** 0.215***     0.366*** 0.365*** 0.135** 0.133**   
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.061) (0.060)     (0.059) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062)   
UR# -0.016 -0.016 -0.010** -0.010** -0.007 -0.008 -0.0160** -0.016** 0.034 0.034 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.071** -0.065** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.004) (0.004) (0.034) (0.034) (0.006) (0.006) (0.026) (0.024) (0.005) (0.005) (0.029) (0.029) 
PreElect# -0.009  -0.001  -0.010  -0.003  -0.004  0.003* 0.004** 0.016  
 (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.011)  
PostElect# 0.007  0.004* 0.004* 0.020  0.001  -0.013  -0.001  -0.018 -0.021* 
 (0.010)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.015)  (0.002)  (0.013)  (0.002)  (0.011) (0.011) 
TPart 0.001  0.002** 0.002** 0.020** 0.019*** 0.002* 0.002** -0.001  0.002** 0.002** 0.005  
 (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)  
RPart# -0.020* -0.020* -0.001  -0.003  0.001  -0.021* -0.022** 0.001  0.017  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.002)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.002)  (0.015)  
CRPart# 0.014 0.014* 0.001  -0.040* -0.040* 0.001  0.049** 0.049** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.021** -0.013* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.002)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.005)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.007) 
               
               
No. Obs. 265 265 265 265 267 267 265 265 265 265 265 265 267 267 
R
2
 0.686 0.682 0.765 0.765 0.387 0.379 0.353 0.352 0.782 0.781 0.694 0.693 0.281 0.267 
B-G test 0.628 0.649 0.381 0.384 0.143 0.168 0.579 0.576 0.845 0.793 0.298 0.322 0.928 0.838 
SBIC -798.0 -811.6 -1642.6 -1659.1 -504.0 -517.6 -1419.1 -1435.5 -666.8 -682.4 -1503.6 -1513.8 -600.8 -612.5 
               
UR lag #4 #4 #4 #4 #2 #2 #6 #6 #2 #2 #1 #1 #2 #2 
Months PreElect9 PreElect9 PreElect12 PreElect12 PreElect8 PreElect8 PreElect6 PreElect6 PreElect11 PreElect11 PreElect8 PreElect8 PreElect6 PreElect6 
 PosElect3 PosElect3 PosElect3 PosElect3 PosElect5 PosElect5 PosElect12 PosElect12 PosElect3 PosElect3 PosElect11 PosElect11 PosElect6 PosElect6 
 RPart3 RPart3 RPart9 RPart9 RPart24 RPart24 RPart6 RPart6 RPart6 RPart6 RPart12 RPart12 RPart3 RPart3 
 CRPart9 CRPart9 CRPart9 CRPart9 CRPart3 CRPart3 CRPart6 CRPart6 CRPart3 CRPart3 CRPart24 CRPart24 CRPart24 CRPart24 
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